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NORTH

DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

The court apparently overlooked an additional reason for holding the
communications in question privileged. The defendant's counsel was admitted
to practice before the United States District Court of New York to represent
his employer in litigation; and the documents in question were directly connected with that action. It is submitted that admission to litigate a case before
any recognized and established court of law should be sufficient to qualify
counsel as attorney within the scope of the attorney-client privilege for
4
communications directly connected with that action.'
JOHN MICHAEL NILLES
INSURANCE-EXTENT

OF LIABILITY-RECOVERY

IN

ABSENCE

OF PECUNIAnY

Loss.-Plaintiff, insured, sued defendant, insurer, to recover for a loss sustained under a fire insurance policy issued by defendant. The plaintiff
occupied the insured premises as lessee, the terms of the lease providing that
the lessor would repair any damage to the premises resulting from fire. The
contract of insurance between plaintiff and defendant provided that for the
purposes of that agreement, the plaintiff was to be considered the sole and
unconditional owner. Shortly after the loss suffered under the policy, the
lessor repaired the damaged premises pursuant to the terns of the lease. It was
held that the defendant's liability attached on the happening of the loss and
that subsequent restoration without cost to the plaintiff did not relieve the
defendant of its accrued liability. Citizens Insurance Company v. Foxbilt,
Inc., 226 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1955).
The question of whether an insured may recover when he has suffered no
pecuniary loss is one of controversy. Fire insurance is generally considered
to be a personal contract.' The weight of authority requires that there be an
insurable interest, 2 and that actual pecuniary loss be sustained, 3 before there
can be recovery. Generally, a tenant is said to have an insurable interest in
the leasehold. 4 It has frequently been stated by the courts that one may not
make a profit on fire insurance. 5 The rule in England is that the insured is
considered to have suffered no loss when a person under a contract duty to
repair has made good the damage. 6 It is argued in support of the above
position that public policy demands such a result to prevent "wagering con7
tracts" and the intentional destruction of property.
14. See Radin The Privileg. of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client 16 Calif. L. Rev. 487 for a scholarly discussion of the history and present status of
the attorney-client privilege.
1.

E.g., Traders' Ins. Co. v. Newman,

120 Ind. 554, 22 N.E. 428

(1889);

Mack v.

Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 329 I11. 158, 160 N.E. 222 (1928).
2. 4 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 2121 (1941).
3. E.g., Draper v. Delaware State Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 5 Boyce 143, 91 AtI.
206 (Del. 1914); Beman v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 303 111.App. 554, 25 N.E.
2d 603 (1940); Abbottsford Building & Loan Assoc. v. Win. Penn Fire Ins. Co., 133 Pa.
Super. 422, 197 Atl. 504 (1938); Ramsdell v. Ins. Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136, 221
N.W. 654 (1928).
4. 4 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice §2193 (1941).
5. Accord. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Scheuer, 298 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1924);
Tabbut v. American Ins. Co., 185 Mass. 419, 70 N.E. 430 (1904); Liverpool & London
& Globe Ins. Co. v. Boiling, 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518 (1940).
6. Darrell v. Tibbitts, 5 Q.B.D. 560 (1880).

7. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Boiling, 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518
(1940); It should be noted that the lower court held that Iowa public policy was not

inv olved in the case, but rather the insured's contract right to recover on the insurance

policy. The lower court further stated that if Iowa public policy were believed to be involved, the case would have been remanded to the Iowa state courts courts for decision.
128 F.Supp. 594 (S.D.

lova 1955).

RECENT CASES

The court in the principal case, following the so-called New York rule,"
points out that the defendant contracted to consider the plaintiff as the unconditional owner, and from that contract arose a primary liability to the
plaintiff." This liability was said to attach at the happening of the loss. The
defendant, through the receipt of premiums, was compensated for acceptence
of the risk of loss and if it was now excused from liability it would seem that
the defendant would be the recipient of a windfall.' 0 The fact that the thirdparty lessor also assumed the risk of loss, in consideration of increased rent
receipts, does not effect the defendant's liability. 1 1 It is a general principle
that parties to an insurance contract may provide any rights and obligations
thereunder, 1" which are not unreasonable, illegal, or contrary to public policy.13
It appears from the decision in the principle case that the desire for freedom
4
in contracting is lending some courts to ignore public policy restrictions.'
While the instant case is not criticizable in its application of the law,
double recovery should be avoided. In the mortgagee insurance cases, after
the insurer has paid the mortgagee, the latter's claim against the mortgagor
passes by subrogation to the insurer. 1 5 By analogy, it may be reasoned that
in situations such as the principal case presents, the Lessee's contract right
against the Lessor should pass to the insurer. 16 It has also been suggested that
the doctrine of contribution be extended to apply to the third-party obligor
and the insurer.'7
It may be inferred from a decision's and a statute19 that North Dakota
follows the majority view in considering insurance to be for indemnity from
actual loss only. If a similar fact situation were presented to the courts of
this state, their holding would probably be contrary to the instant decision.
As an equitable solution in such a case, it is suggested that the insurance policy
be considered void because there was no risk, thus entitling the insured to
restitution of the premiums paid.
RUDOLPH R. RAGER

8. Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 860, 79 N.E.2d
268 (1948); New England Gas & Electric Assoc. v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.,
330 Mass. 640, 116 N.E. 2d 671, 682 (1953) (dictum).
9. Western Assurance Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 606, 7 So. 379 (1889).
10. See Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 860, 79 N.E.
2d 268 (1948).
11. Foley v. Manufacturer's Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897); Pink v.
Smith, 281 Mich. 107, 274 N.W. 727 (1937); Heidisch v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. of
America, 368 Pa. 602, 84 Atl. 2d 566 (1951).
12. E.g. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Building Assoc., 183 U.S. 308 (1902);
Bower & Kaufman v. Bothwell, 152 Md. 392, 136 Atl. 892, 894 (1927) (dictum).
13. E.g., Faris v. American National Assurance Co., 44 Cal.App. 48, 185 Pac. 1035
(1919); Haseldon v. Home Ins. Co. 247 Ky. 530, 57 S.W.2d 459 (1933).
14. 36 Gee. L. J. 696 (1948).
15. LeDoux v. Dettmering, 316 Iil.App. 98, 43 N.E.2d 862 (1942); Leyden v. Lawrence,
79 N.J.Eq. 113, 81 Atl. 121 (1911); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Reid, 171 N.C. 513, 88 S.E.
779 (1916).
16. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 286 P.2d 107, (Wash.
1955) (bailor-bailee); Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883) (vendor-vendee). See
also 3 Richards, Insurance § 562 (5th ed. 1952).
17. Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship & Insurance,
47 Harv. L. Rev. 976, 987 (1934); 33 Minn. L. Rev. 82, 84 (1948)..
18. Butler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 64 N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214 (1934).
19. N.D. Rev. Code § 26-0201 (1943) "Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes
to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event."

